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Abstract
We propose a theory of trade in which comparative advantages reveal themselves grad-
ually over the path of development. Following the Ricardian tradition, countries specialise
and export the set of goods they are able to produce at relatively lower cost given their
exogenous initial endowments. However, we introduce two new features into a Ricardian
trade model with horizontally and vertically di⁄erentiated goods. First, individuals have
nonhomothetic preferences in that their willingness to pay for quality rises with their in-
come. Second, heterogeneities in productivity become more pronounced at higher levels of
quality of production. As a result, our theory predicts that the scope for international trade
widens and productive specialisation increases as real incomes grow and wealthier consumers
raise the quality of their consumption baskets. Our predictions ￿nd empirical support in a
number tests performed using bilateral trade data at the product level.
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11 Introduction
Income is a key determinant of consumer choice. A crucial dimension where purchasing power
in￿ uences this choice is the quality of consumption. Agents with very di⁄erent incomes do often
consume the same goods, such as clothes, cars, wines, etc. Yet, the quality of those goods
di⁄ers substantially when looking at poorer versus wealthier households. In an open-economy
world, this entails that the average quality of imports will rise with the GDP per head of the
economy; an implication that has been widely documented in the trade literature. The question
we address here is whether such a change in the structure of imports over the growth path bears
any implications on specialisation and trade ￿ ows across countries within a Ricardian trade
model.
We model a world economy with a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated goods, each
of them available in two varieties: low and high quality. Countries￿technologies di⁄er in the
cost of production of each speci￿c commodity, with some countries being intrinsically more
productive than others in producing certain goods. This is the traditional source of trade in
Ricardian models, leading to specialisation along the horizontal dimension of the commodity
space. Alongside this traditional feature, we suppose that intrinsic productivity di⁄erentials
(on the horizontal dimension) tend to become increasingly pronounced as production moves
up (vertically) on the quality dimension. In other words, a country may have, for example,
a cost advantage in producing wine, while another country may have it in producing whisky,
which would naturally lead them to exchange these two goods. Yet, in our model, productivity
di⁄erences in the wine and whisky industries are not constant along the quality space, but
become more intense at the upper levels of quality of both wines and whiskies. As a result, the
scope for international trade turns out to be wider for high quality varieties than for low quality
ones.
We combine such production structure with nonhomothetic preferences by consumers whose
willingness to pay for quality rises with their purchasing power. In particular, we assume that
individuals value positively the intrinsic quality of the consumption goods. However, in our
preferences speci￿cation, the enhancing e⁄ect of quality on the marginal utility of physical
consumption is greater at higher levels of income. As a result, given market prices, richer
individuals choose to consume a larger set of horizontally di⁄erentiated goods in their higher
quality varieties than poorer consumers do.
2Within such a nonhomothetic setup, we show that at low levels of income all sectors in the
economy may be served to a large extent by local producers. The reason for this is that pro-
ductivity di⁄erentials across producers from di⁄erent economies are relatively narrow for goods
o⁄ered in low quality. However, in a context of secular growth, as individuals concomitantly
upgrade their quality of consumption, productivity di⁄erentials across countries become progres-
sively noticeable, which in turn leads to a gradual process of increasing Ricardian specialisation
across economies.
On the demand side, our theory features a world economy where the structure of consumers
demands change as their incomes rise. In particular, our model predicts that the quality of
imports responds positively to variations in incomes. In that respect, Fieler (2007) shows that
import prices correlate positively with the level of income per head of the importer, and this oc-
curs even when looking at speci￿c commodities originating from the same exporter. In addition,
studies based on household level data also lend support to the presence of nonhomotheticities
linked to quality of consumption, and their relevance to explain the behaviour of imports. Using
household income data for 26 countries in year 2000, Choi, Hummels and Xiang (2009) show that
di⁄erences in importers￿price distributions map into di⁄erences in their income distributions in
a way consistent with rising willingness to pay for quality.1
On the supply side, our model predicts that exporters will adjust their quality of production
to cater markets with di⁄erent income levels. This prediction is also widely supported in the
data. For example, Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) provide evidence of
Mexican manufacturing plants selling higher qualities in US than in their local markets. Brooks
(2006) shows similar results for Colombian manufacturing plants, and Artopoulos, Friel and
Hallak (2011) argue that the recent successful Argentinean exporters were those who managed to
adjust the quality of their products to better appeal developed markets. Finally, in cross-country
study, Hallak and Schott (2011) show that the quality gap in production between countries is
signi￿cantly smaller than the gap in GDP per head.
Our paper then ties together the previous stylised facts, referring both to the demand and
supply sides, within a model where Ricardian comparative advantages become increasingly ap-
1In particular, they show that ￿countries with high incomes consume goods with high prices; countries with
greater variability of incomes over households have greater variability in prices for a particular good; and countries
whose income distributions have fat or skewed tails have also price distributions with fat or skewed tails.￿See
also related evidence in Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Dalgin, Trindade and Mitra (2008).
3parent as ￿rms upgrade their quality of production to meet the demands of wealthier consumers.
In that regard, after streamlining the model, in Section 5 we provide some evidence consistent
with our underlying assumption that productivity di⁄erentials become more intense at higher
levels of quality of production.
Nonhomothetic preferences are by now a common modelling choice in the trade literature.
However, most of past trade literature with nonhomotheticities has focused either on vertical
di⁄erentiation [e.g., Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997)]
or horizontal di⁄erentiation in consumption [e.g., Markusen (1986), Bergstrand (1990) and Mat-
suyama (2000)].2 Two recent articles have combined vertical and horizontal di⁄erentiation with
preferences featuring income-dependent willingness to pay for quality: Jaimovich and Merella
(2010) and Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011).3
Jaimovich and Merella (2010) study the possibility that trade may endogenously generate
income disparities between countries when the scope for quality upgrading di⁄ers across the
types of goods exported by them. That paper proposed a richer nonhomothetic speci￿cation,
where budget reallocations with rising incomes take place both within and across types of goods.
However, in contrast with the present paper, it does not generate an endogenous and gradual
evolution of international trade, as it assumed relative cost advantages that are independent of
the quality of production.
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) analyse how di⁄erences in income distributions between economies
with access to the same technologies determine trade ￿ ows in the presence of increasing returns
and trade cost. Like ours, their paper leads to an endogenous emergence of comparative advan-
tages, which may have remained latent for quite some time (either due to trade costs being too
high or countries￿income distributions being too similar). Our paper sticks to the Ricardian
tradition where trade is the result of di⁄erences in technologies featuring constant returns to
scale, and our main mechanism di⁄ers from theirs in the following: comparative advantages and
trade emerge gradually, not because trade costs prevent the e¢ cient exploitation of increasing
returns, but because the demand for commodities displaying wider heterogeneity in terms of
cost of production (i.e. high quality goods) expands as incomes rise. In that respect, an impor-
tant implication of our model is that the quality of traded goods and specialisation depend on
2See also Foellmi, Hepenstrick and Zweimuller (2010) for a recent working paper with horizontal di⁄erentiation
and nonhomothetic preferences with discrete choice of consumption between either zero or one unit of good.
3Taylor (1993), Alcala (2009), and Benedetti Fasil and Borota (2009) also study Ricardian models of trade
with horizontally and vertically di⁄erentiated goods, but they all do it within a homothetic framework.
4the world income distribution, whereas in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) they depend on countries￿
incomes distributions taken separately.4
A key assumption in our theory is the widening in productivity di⁄erentials at higher levels of
quality. To the best of our knowledge, Alcala (2009) is the only other paper explicitly introducing
a similar feature into a Ricardian model of trade. An important di⁄erence is that he keeps the
homothetic demand structure presented in Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977), hence our
main insights and predictions in terms of evolution of trade ￿ ows and specialisation along the
path of development are novel to our paper.
Finally, our paper relates to Linder (1961) and Hallak (2010) views of quality as an impor-
tant dimension in explaining trade ￿ ows between countries. In that regard, we propose a new
mechanism that links together quality of production, income per capita and trade over the path
of development.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of our model
for the case of a closed economy in order to cleanly depict the speci￿cities of the assumed
nonhomothetic preferences. Section 3 introduces trade within a two-country world economy
where both economies are ex-ante identical in their productivities; this section represents the
core of our paper. Section 4 extends our main results to situations with trade frictions and
with ex-ante heterogeneities in productivities across countries. Section 5 presents a variety
of illustrative empirical results consistent with the main predictions of our model. Section 6
concludes. All relevant proofs can be found in Appendix A.
2 A One-Country Setting
We consider an economy with a commodity space de￿ned along two distinct dimensions: hor-
izontal and vertical. The horizontal dimension refers to di⁄erent types of goods, such as cars,
wines, co⁄ee beans, etc. The vertical dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of the each speci￿c
good. We order commodities horizontally by the good index  along the goods space V = [01],
and vertically by the quality index  2 f01g. In plain words, each good  2 V is present in two
levels of quality: a low-quality version ( = 0) and high-quality one ( = 1). Given this setup, we
designate each particular commodity by a speci￿c good-quality pair, namely: () 2 V￿f01g.
4More precisely, as world incomes rise, all economies in our model will adjust upwards their quality of pro-
duction to cater wealthier consumers demand, which in turn leads to higher specialisation in the world economy
owing to intensi￿cation of comparative advantage at higher levels of quality of production.
52.1 Production
In each sector  2 V, there is a continuum of ￿rms that may actively produce good . Production
technology is idiosyncratic to the sector. In order to produce one unit of commodity (), a
￿rm in sector  needs to put in use (1 + ￿)=￿ units of labour, where ￿￿  0. We interpret
the parameter ￿ as the cost of quality upgrading. Henceforth we assume that each ￿ is
independently drawn from a probability density function (￿) with full support over R++.5 The
parameter ￿ applies identically to all sectors, and we interpret it as the total factor productivity
in the economy.
Since in each sector  there is a continuum of ￿rms able to produce each commodity ()




, for all () 2 V ￿ f01g; (1)
where  denotes the wage per unit of labour. We assume consumers randomly choose which
￿rm to buy the commodity () from, among all those actively producing it.
2.2 Consumption
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals with unit mass. Individuals are endowed
one unit of time, which they supply in the labour market in exchange for . All individuals
have identical preferences de￿ned over the commodity space V￿f01g. We let  denote the
(physical) quantity of consumption of good  in quality . The consumption choice is binary:
the individual may either consume one unit of a commodity (), or not consume it at all.
More precisely,  2 f01g for all () 2 V ￿ f01g.6
Individuals preferences are summarised by the following utility function, which is linearly
5None of our key results actually require that the support of (￿) is unbounded above, which we just assume
for simplicity. In particular, we could instead let (￿) be a uniform distribution over the interval (0￿), and all
our main results would remain qualitatively intact.
6Preferences where consumption is a binary choice between 0 and 1 units have been used in trade models
with horizontally di⁄erentiated goods by Matsuyama (2000) and Foellmi, Hepenstrick and Zweimuller (2011).
Our speci￿cation in (2) below also incorporates a vertical dimension by letting quality a⁄ect the level of utility











=f01g  if 0 + 1 ￿ 1
¬1 if 0 + 1  1
(2)
The above utility function aims to capture two properties which are essential to our theory.
First, quality is desirable to the consumer. Second, and more importantly, the willingness to
pay for quality rises with the level of real income. This implies that the optimal consumption
bundle is income-dependent (in particular, it leads to a solution where richer individuals will
purchase larger fraction of goods in high quality versions).











[0 + (1 + ￿)1] =  (3)
A few remarks about the consumer problem are worth noting now. First, from (2) it imme-
diately follows that individuals will consume (at most) one quality of each good  2 V. That is,
for each , an individual may choose either 0 = 1 (and 1 = 0), or 1 = 1 (and 0 = 0),
but never both equal to one simultaneously. In addition, given (3), since all  enter symmet-
rically into  =
R
V  , it must be straightforward to observe that, given two generic goods
000 2 V, if an individual chooses 01 = 1 and 000 = 1, then commodity (01) must be
cheaper than (001); in other words, it must be the case that ￿0  ￿00.
For the remaining of this section we take labour as the numeraire of the economy, by setting
 = 1. Moreover, in order to focus on cases where the consumer￿ s optimisation problem is
well-de￿ned, hereafter we let ￿ ￿ 1.
When ￿ = 1, the consumer will buy one unit of each good  2 V at the baseline quality level
( = 0), as otherwise he will fail to satisfy the subsistence level of consumption of some of the
goods. The interesting cases arise when ￿  1, as the individual may actually buy some of the
goods in high-quality versions, while still meeting the subsistence level of consumption for all .
More precisely, when ￿  1, the individual will use the "additional" real income (￿ ¬ 1) to raise
the quality of consumption of the subset of goods whose quality can be more easily upgraded.
In other words, when ￿  1, there exists a threshold b ￿  0 such that the individual purchases
all goods whose ￿ ￿ b ￿ in high quality ( = 1), while buying those with ￿  b ￿ in low quality
( = 0). Given the individual￿ s budget constraint (3), the value of the threshold b ￿ is pinned










 (￿)￿ = 1 (4)
where the integrals on the left-hand side represent spending on high-quality and low-quality
commodities, respectively. Computing the integrals in (4) and re-arranging terms yields:
(b ￿) [￿j￿  b ￿] = ￿ ¬ 1 (5)
where (￿) denotes the cumulative distribution function associated to  (￿). Bearing in mind
that both (b ￿) and  [￿j￿ ￿ b ￿] are increasing in b ￿, and the fact that (0) = 0, we may





b ￿ (￿) if 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 +  [￿]
1 if ￿  1 +  [￿];
(6)
with b ￿ (1) = 0 and b ￿ (￿)￿  0 for all 1 ￿ ￿  1 +  [￿].
The function b ￿ (￿) in (6) summarises the nonhomothetic behaviour of demand implied by (2).
An increase in ￿ drives all prices (relative to the wage) down, implying a proportional rise in the
consumer￿ s real income. As consumers get richer, their willingness to pay for quality accordingly
goes up, and they begin raising the quality of some of the di⁄erentiated goods they consume,
starting by those whose cost of quality upgrading is relatively lower (that is, those carrying a
relatively low ￿). Richer individuals thus consume a larger fraction of goods in high quality
versions, which is featured by the fact that b ￿ (￿) is an increasing function of ￿. Eventually, when
￿ ￿ 1 +  [￿], individuals are rich enough so as to be able to a⁄ord all goods in the set V in
their high quality versions.
3 A Symmetric Two-Country World Economy
We consider now a setting with two economies, the Home and Foreign economies, denoted by
the letters  and , respectively. In each economy, there is a unit continuum of individuals,
each of them endowed with one unit of labour time. Labour is immobile across countries. We
take the wage in  as the numeraire, by setting  = 1, and denote by  =  the wage in .
All consumers in the world share identical preferences, given by (2). Both  and  are open to
international trade, and we assume there exist no trade cost.
83.1 Production Side and Consumer Choice
Analogously to the closed-economy case, we assume that in country  2 fg there exist a




=￿ units of labour into one unit of commodity
(), where the parameter ￿ ￿ 1 denotes now the common level of total factor productivity.
Heterogeneities in sectoral productivity across countries arise from the fact that each ￿ 2
V￿fg is independently drawn from a probability density function  (￿) with full support
over R++.
In line with the previous section, we assume that when producers from both  and  o⁄er
commodity () 2 V ￿ f01g at the same price, consumers will randomly choose which ￿rm
to buy it from, among all those actively supplying it. Notice, as well, that given the zero trade
cost assumption, whenever the price of a particular commodity () is strictly di⁄erent across
producers from di⁄erent countries, an individual choosing to actively consume commodity ()
will then buy it from the country selling it at the lower price.
The last two considerations in the above paragraph have two important consequences.
Firstly, given that the unit labour cost of any low-quality commodity is independent of the
cost of quality upgrading, a necessary condition for commodity (0) to be actively produced in
country  (resp., in ) is that  ￿ 1 (resp.,  ￿ 1). Formally, we let ￿ denote the fraction of
demand for (0) catered by producers from country . (The complementary fraction (1 ¬ ￿)
is then supplied by ￿rms from .) Utility maximisation by consumers implies that
￿
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
= 1 when   1
2 [01] when  = 1
= 0 when   1
(7)
From (7) we can readily observe that our model does not place any restrictions on ￿ when
 = 1. This implies that if the general equilibrium solution turns out to deliver  = 1, our
model may actually sustain such equilibrium (relative) wage with an in￿nite number of di⁄erent
combinations of ￿ across the set of goods V. For this reason, henceforth, we restrict the
attention to symmetric cases, where all ￿ take the same value in equilibrium; that is, to cases
in which ￿ = ￿ for all  2 V.7
7Essentially, if ￿ = ￿ is consistent with a general equilibrium in this two-country world economy, then any
combination of f￿g2V such that
 1
0 ￿ = ￿ will be so too. Such multiplicity of cases is of little interest for
our theory, hence we choose to focus on the most straightforward case when all ￿ are equal in equilibrium.
9Secondly, for goods o⁄ered in high qualities (that is, with  = 1), heterogeneity in the
cost of quality upgrading also plays a role in determining specialisation. In particular, letting







From (8) it follows that commodity (1) will be supplied only by  (obtained by setting  = 












 ¬ 1 (10)
Similarly to the closed-economy case, we may split the goods space V into two distinct
subsets: one comprising goods consumed in low qualities, and the other one comprising goods
consumed in high qualities. However, this two-country world economy requires heavier notation
than the closed-economy case. In particular, we can identify four thresholds (instead of only one,
as in the closed-economy case), generically indicated by b ￿
0, where 0 2 fg. (Superscript
 refers to the country of origin of the consumer, whereas subscript 0 generally refers to the
country of origin of the producer.) Such thresholds on the goods space may possibly di⁄er along
two distinct dimensions: i) across economies, thresholds may di⁄er depending on the consumers￿
relative real income (i.e., b ￿
0 and b ￿
0 may possibly di⁄er if incomes in  and  are not equal); ii)
for a given economy, thresholds may also be di⁄erent for locally produced and imported goods,
depending on the relative wage paid by ￿rms (i.e., b ￿
 and b ￿
 may possibly di⁄er if wages in 
and  are not equal). Formally, the thresholds are characterised in the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 1 Denote by b ￿
0, with 0 2 fg, the thresholds on ￿0 for individuals from 
such that:
i) whenever ￿ ￿ b ￿
 and ￿ ￿ b ￿
, then individuals from  actively consume commodity
(0), buying it from producers from the country with the lower wage, or randomising between
both countries when  = 1;
ii) whenever ￿  b ￿
 and condition (9) holds, then individuals from  actively consume com-
modity (1), buying it from producers from ;
iii) whenever ￿  b ￿
 and condition (10) holds, then individuals from  actively consume
commodity (1), buying it from producers from .
10Figure 1: Quality thresholds for an individual from .
Notice that De￿nition (1) implies that a particular relationship exists between the two thresh-
olds referring to consumers of a particular country of origin. More precisely, b ￿
 and b ￿
 are tied
to one another by the following condition:8
b ￿
 = (1 + b ￿
) ¬ 1 where  2 fg (11)
Figure 1 plots a graphic representation of the thresholds b ￿
 and b ￿
, for the speci￿c case in




into three regions:  and . Region  comprises the set goods that are consumed
by country  in  = 0 (a fraction ￿ of these goods are supplied by producers from ). Region
 comprises the set goods that are consumed by country  in  = 1, being all supplied by
producers from . Finally, region  consists of the set goods that are also consumed by country
 in  = 1, but in this case being supplied by producers from .
Using (7) and the notation introduced in De￿nition 1, we can now write down the budget
8If (11) were not satis￿ed opportunities to increase utility would arise. Suppose for instance that  ￿

 
(1 +  ￿

) ¬ 1. Then, (1 +  ￿

)  1 +  ￿

, and individuals from  could increase their utility by reducing
the measure of high-quality goods imported from  (lower  ￿

) while expanding more than proportionally its
domestic counterpart ( ￿

). An analogous argument holds if we look into the opposite inequality, hence (11) must
necessarily hold in equilibrium.































































where  =  and  = 1.
Compared to the one-country version (4), budget constraint (12) features the di⁄erentiation
of both high-quality and low-quality purchases by producers￿origin: the ￿rst two terms refer to
goods supplied by producers from  (the ￿rst in high quality and the second in low quality),
while the third and fourth terms account for goods produced in  (the third in high quality and
the fourth in low quality).
3.2 Equilibrium
The general equilibrium in this two-country world economy requires that aggregate demand
of goods produced by a country must equal aggregate supply of goods produced by the same
country. Such market clearing condition can be shown to be identical to that of equilibrium
trade balance, namely: the value of total exports by one country must equal the value of total
imports by the same country. (In what follows, we primarily conduct our equilibrium analysis
by looking at the trade balance equilibrium condition.)
From (7) and De￿nition 1, we may write down the equilibrium condition for the trade balance




































































The LHS of (13) equals the total value of exports by  to , which is itself composed by two
separate terms: the ￿rst with the total value of goods exported by  in high quality varieties
(these are goods with relatively low realisations of ￿); the second with the total value of
goods exported by  in low quality varieties. Similarly, the RHS of (13) equals the total value
12of imports by  from , which comprises two di⁄erent terms: the ￿rst with the total value of
goods imported by  in high quality varieties (these are goods with relatively low realisations
of ￿); the second with the total value of goods imported by  in low quality varieties.
The following lemma brie￿ y characterises some important qualitative e⁄ects of changes of ￿
and  on the quality thresholds as introduced by De￿nition 1.
Lemma 1 Let 0 2 fg. If, in equilibrium, b ￿
0 is ￿nite, then: i) b ￿
0￿  0; ii)
b ￿
0  0; iii) b ￿
0  0.








rise with the level
of total factor productivity ￿. The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward: as ￿
grows, real incomes rise both in  and , leading to an expansion of the set of goods individuals
consume in higher quality versions. The second and third parts of Lemma 1 state a rise in 
leads to an expansion of the set of goods consumed in  = 1 in  (that is, both b ￿
 and b ￿
 rise
with ), while it leads to a reduction of such set in  (that is, both b ￿
 and b ￿
 fall with ). The
reason for these opposing results lies in the asymmetric movements of real income generated by
changes in : the real income in  rises with , while in  real income declines with .
The next lemma deals with the speci￿c case in which wages are the same in  and .
Lemma 2 If, in equilibrium,  = 1, then: b ￿
 = b ￿
 = b ￿
 = b ￿
 = b ￿. In addition, the threshold





b ￿ (￿) if 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿)




0 ￿ (￿)(￿)d￿, hence 0  ￿   [￿]. Also, ￿ (1) = 0 and ￿ (￿)￿  0
for all 1 ￿ ￿  1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿).
The intuition underlying Lemma 2 rests both on income and price e⁄ects associated to  = 1.
In particular, when  = 1,  and  will enjoy the same real income. This implies that, given
the set of prices, individuals from  and  must optimally choose the same consumption bundle,
hence b ￿
 = b ￿
 and b ￿
 = b ￿
. In addition to that,  = 1 ￿ together with the fact that all ￿ 2
V￿fg are independently drawn from an identical probability distribution￿ , implies that
both economies may o⁄er an equal mass of commodities in  = 1 at a price no larger than a
certain threshold, therefore we also have that b ￿
 = b ￿
 and b ￿
 = b ￿

13We can now determine the equilibrium (relative) wage in this symmetric two-country world
economy.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium,  = 1 for any feasible level of ￿.
Proposition 1 shows that, in this symmetric two-country world economy, the relative wage
remains unchanged and equal to unity all along the growth path. This also implies that the real
income in both  and  is always equal to their common ￿. The reason for this result is the
following: while ￿ grows, aggregate demands and supplies grow together at identical speed in
 and . As a consequence, markets will constantly clear in the world economy, without the
need of any adjustment in relative wages.
3.3 Specialisation and Trade along the Growth Path
The equiproportional aggregate variations implicit in Proposition 1 conceal the fact that, along
the balanced growth path, economies also experience changes in their productive structure at
the sectoral level. Such sectoral reallocations of labour stem from the interplay of demand and
supply side factors. On the demand side, as real incomes grow with a rising ￿, individuals
start consuming a larger fraction of goods in their higher quality varieties. On the supply
side, heterogeneity in labour productivity across countries arise as producers intend to raise the
quality of their output. Hence, the interplay between income-dependent willingness to pay for
quality and the intensi￿cation of comparative advantage at higher levels of quality leads to a
gradual process of sectoral specialisation over the growth path.
The implied process of sectoral specialisation displays some speci￿c traits that deserve a more
detailed analysis: our model predicts that richer economies will tend to buy a larger fraction of
their consumption goods from producers who display a comparative advantage in those goods
(that is, from producers with relatively low realisations of ￿). We can see this result more
formally by looking at the average value of ￿ from whom individuals (either from  or ) buy
their consumption goods. More precisely, we may de￿ne the average degree of comparative
advantage of producers catering to country ￿ s demand as follows:
 [￿jdemanded] ￿ 2
Z  ￿(￿)
0
￿ [1 ¬ (￿)] (￿) +
Z 1
 ￿(￿)
￿ [1 ¬ (b ￿ (￿))] (￿); (15)
where  2 fg. The ￿rst term in (15) is integrating over the set of producers supplying
goods in  = 1, while the second term is integrating over the set of producers supplying goods
14in  = 0. A lower value of (15) means that consumers are buying from producers displaying (on
average) a lower ￿.
Proposition 2 The level of  [￿jdemanded] de￿ned in (15) is non-increasing in ￿. In partic-
ular:
i) for all 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1+2( [￿] ¬ ￿),  [￿jdemanded] is strictly decreasing in ￿, with its highest
value  [￿jdemanded] =  [￿] when ￿ = 1;
ii) for all ￿  1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿),  [￿jdemanded] = 2( [￿] ¬ ￿), where ￿ was previously
de￿ned in Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 refers to the average value of ￿ calculated over the entire consumption bundle
purchased by a consumer (either from  or from ), disregarding the origin of the producer
selling the commodities. We can, however, easily extend that result to the average value of
￿ taking into account only imported goods purchased by the consumer (again, either from 
or from ). By analogy, the average degree of comparative advantage of exporters catering to
country ￿ s imported demand can written as follows:
 [￿jimported] ￿
R  ￿(￿)
0 ￿ [1 ¬ (￿)] (￿) + 1
2
R 1
 ￿(￿) ￿ [1 ¬ (b ￿ (￿))] (￿)
R  ￿(￿)
0 [1 ¬ (￿)] (￿) + 1
2
R 1




0 [1 ¬ (￿)] (￿) + 1
2
R 1
 ￿(￿) [1 ¬ (b ￿ (￿))] (￿) = 12, it follows that
 [￿jimported] =  [￿jdemanded]. As a result, all the statements in Proposition (2) identi-
cally apply to imported goods, as expressed below:
Proposition 2 (bis) The level of  [￿￿jimported] de￿ned in (16) is non-increasing in ￿. In
particular:
i) for all 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1+2( [￿] ¬ ￿),  [￿￿jimported] is strictly decreasing in ￿, with its highest
value  [￿￿jimported] =  [￿] when ￿ = 1;
ii) for all ￿  1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿),  [￿￿jimported] = 2( [￿] ¬ ￿).
Proposition 2 (bis) deals on how imports shift towards producers with lower realisations of
￿ as individuals get richer. A related result can be found when comparing the comparative
advantage of exporters (measured again by the relative level of ￿) in cases of exports in high
quality versus exports in low quality. Essentially, the widening of heterogeneities in labour
productivity at the upper level of qualities implies that exporters of goods in  = 1 will exhibit
15(on average) a higher productivity than those exporting their products in  = 0. We de￿ne
below the degree of comparative advantage of exporters from country 0, conditional on the





































1 ¬ (b ￿)
; (18)
where (17) and (18) are already taking into account that b ￿
0 = b ￿
 = b ￿ when  = 1. From (17)
and (18), the following proposition straightforwardly obtains
Proposition 3 The average degree of comparative advantage of exporters from country 0 is

















 where 0 2 fg
Proposition 3 refers to exports by the same exporter in di⁄erent levels of quality. However,
since in this symmetric two-country world economy the general equilibrium delivers  = 1 and
Lemma 2 thus applies, an identical result holds when comparing exports of di⁄erent quality
across exporters of di⁄erent origin. The following proposition re-states the previous one in a
more general way, so as to encompass comparisons across exporters of di⁄erent nationalities.
Proposition 3 (bis) The average degree of comparative advantage of exporters, regardless of
their country of origin, is increasing in the level of quality of their exports. That is,
 [￿expo








 where 0 2 fg
4 Extensions
4.1 Trade Costs in a Two-Country World Economy
In this subsection we introduce trade costs in our benchmark model. These take the form of a
unit ￿ iceberg￿cost to selling goods abroad: for each commodity () 2 V ￿ f01g, producers
must export ￿ units of it, where ￿  1, for one unit to arrive at the importer￿ s market. For
this extension, ￿ ￿ 1 still denotes the level of total factor productivity, and we let again each
￿ 2 V ￿ fg be drawn independently from  (￿), which has full support over ++.
16The introduction of trade costs implies that an individual in country  (resp., from )
imports low-quality commodities only if   1=￿ (resp., if   ￿). It also entails that high-




























: that is to say, the set of commodities that are bought locally
by consumers in  does not coincide anymore with the set of goods imported by consumers in
, and vice versa. An immediate consequence of this is that condition (11) does not analogously




























































































where: ￿ = 1 when   1=￿ ￿ = 0 when   1=￿, and ￿ 2 [01] when  = 1=￿ The


































































where: ￿ = 1 when   ￿ ￿ = 0 when   ￿, and ￿ 2 [01] when  = ￿






































































































In our benchmark model in Section 3, we have seen that economies experience changes in their
productive structure at the sectoral level. In particular, as incomes rise, sectoral specialisation
increases in those sectors where economies display a comparative advantage. However, at the
aggregate level, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP remain constant all along the growth
path. As the following proposition shows, by introducing trade costs in our benchmark model,
we are able to generate also changes in trade ￿ ows at the aggregate level.
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium with unit relative wage, the ratio of total exports or imports
to GDP is (weakly) increasing with the level of ￿.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is analogous to those underlying our benchmark model￿ s
results on sectoral trade. Richer individuals consume a larger set of horizontally di⁄erenti-
ated goods in their higher quality varieties. As a result, since sectoral productivity di⁄erentials
become increasingly pronounced as production moves up on the quality space, the scope for
international trade increases with rising total factor productivity. In the presence of trade costs,
however, a new feature emerges compared to our benchmark model. At ￿rst, when individuals
are too poor, they demand only low-quality varieties, which are always supplied cheaper do-
mestically and, thus, no international trade takes place. Goods begin to be exchanged across
countries only when individuals are su¢ ciently rich to start consuming high-quality goods. In
9Notice that, when  = 1, we also have ￿
 = 1 and ￿
 = 0.
18addition, as incomes grow and the fraction of goods consumed in their high-quality variety rises,
international trade further expands. Hence, when trade costs are introduced to our benchmark
model, the imports/GDP ratio rises steadily and monotonically as ￿ grows.
This last prediction of our model is in line with vast empirical evidence. Measures of mer-
chandise exports relative to GDP, compiled by several sources including the GATT International
Trade and the World bank, has increased up to 2.5 times as fast as income in the postwar period
(see, e.g., Krugman, 1995, Feenstra, 1998, and Bajona, 2004). Using a more comprehensive
measure of manufacturing trade series (compiled by summing up the total value of imports and
exports in the categories 5-8 of the SITC Rev. 2 classi￿cation system), together with data for
manufacturing gross output, both acquired from OECD databases, Dalton (2010) shows that
the trade share of gross output in manufacturing increased by a factor of 4.70. Furthermore,
Ishii and Yi (1997) examine two-digit ISIC manufacturing export share data, collected from
various sources, from 1970 to 1990, and ￿nd that almost all considered countries experienced
export share increases over time in virtually every sector. Finally, Krugman (1995) and Feenstra
(1998) also produces further evidence based on the trade shares in the U.K., the U.S, and Ger-
many; the ratios of merchandise trade to merchandise value-added; the shares of U.S. exports
and imports by end-use categories; and the ratio of imported to total intermediate inputs.
4.2 Cross-Country Inequality in a Two-Country World Economy
In this subsection we let total factor productivity be country speci￿c. Namely, we let countries
be characterised by their own technological parameter ￿, with  2 fg. To keep the analysis
concise, we will focus on one speci￿c case: ￿ = 1 and ￿ = ￿  1. We maintain throughout
the assumption that each ￿ 2 V￿fg is independently drawn from a probability density
function  (￿) with full support over R++. For the rest of this subsection we assume  (￿) exhibits a
non-decreasing hazard rate; more formally,  [(￿)(1 ¬ (￿))]￿ ￿ 0 As in our benchmark
model, we assume there are no trade costs.
The main intention here is to show that our results in Section 3.3 extend quite naturally
to a setup in which the two economies di⁄er in terms of their relative purchasing power at a
given point in time. Section 3.3 has shown (in Proposition 2) that as countries turn richer
when the common ￿ rises, their citizens gradually upgrade their quality of consumption, and
this shifts demand towards producers with lower realisations of ￿. The counterpart of this
result is that the exporters who specialise in high-quality commodities are actually those with
19lower realisations of ￿ (Proposition 3). In this subsection we show that analogous results hold
when comparing a richer and a poorer economy: the former purchases a larger fraction of their
consumption from producers with lower realisations of ￿ (Proposition 6 below)
Let ￿ denote again the fraction of demand for goods in low-quality varieties ( = 0) supplied
by producers from country . In this case, we have: ￿ = 1 when   ￿; ￿ 2 [01] when  = ￿,
and ￿ = 0 when   ￿.















Take an individual from country  2 fg. His budget constraint is given by:
[1 ¬ (b ￿


























































































































The ￿rst result of this subsection deals with the relative wage.
Proposition 5 Let ￿ = 1 and ￿  1. Then, in equilibrium,   1.
Proposition 5 shows that income per head in  is always larger than in . The reason is
simply that, when ￿  ￿  is on average more productive than . As a consequence, the
20equilibrium wage in  must rise above one, so as to allow  to export enough goods to  and
comply with the equilibrium trade balance. In other words, should  ￿ 1, then there would be
excess demand of goods produced in . This would drive the relative wage up, until the goods
(and labour) markets clear.
An interesting implication that follows from Proposition 5 is that, in equilibrium, the thresh-
olds dividing the goods space are such that: b ￿
  b ￿
 and b ￿
  b ￿
 .10 That is, given the
supplier￿ s origin, individuals from  buy a larger fraction of goods in the higher-quality version.
By a similar reasoning as in Section 3.3, we may de￿ne the comparative advantage of producers
catering to country ￿ s demand as the average level of ￿ among those producers from which
individuals from  purchase their consumption. Using the same notation as in Section 3.3, we
obtain the following result:11











The intuition for Proposition 6 is the same as that for Proposition 2 in the symmetric case.
Richer individuals (in this case, those from ) buy a larger of their consumption goods in the
higher-quality versions. This drives a larger share of ￿ s aggregate demand towards producers
who may o⁄er higher-quality commodities at lower prices, implying that the average value of ￿
for producers selling their output in  is lower than for those selling their output in .
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Exporters Behaviour
Our theory is based on the fundamental assumption that countries￿relative e¢ ciency in pro-
duction becomes more pronounced as they move up (vertically) along the quality ladders. In its
purest sense, this assumption is really hard to test empirically. However, the assumed intensi￿-
cation of comparative advantage at higher quality levels implies that the degree of specialization
10This result can be seen as an immediate extension of Lemma 1. Rigorously speaking, that lemma cannot be
directly applied in this case, as the budget constraints (25) are not exactly the same as in Section 3. However,
notice that the partial derivatives  ￿

0  0 and  ￿

0  0 take ￿ as a constant, hence the same (qualitative)
result would obtain for (25) following the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1.












are provided in proof of Propo-
sition 6 in the Appendix.
21of countries in speci￿c goods and the level of quality of their exports should display a positive
correlation. In this subsection we aim to provide some suggestive evidence of this.
Objective data on products quality is hardly available for a large set of goods. For that
reason, we take unit values as a proxy for the quality of the commodity.12 To measure the
degree of specialization we use the revealed comparative advantage (RCA); that is, for each





where  () is the total value of exports of product  by country  (by the world) and
 () is the aggregate value of exports by country  (by the world).
We compute unit values of exports using the dataset compiled by Gaulier and Zignano (2010).
This database reports monetary values and physical quantities of bilateral trade for years 1995
to 2009 for more than 5000 products categorised according to the 6-digit Harmonised System
(HS-6).13 Monetary values are measured FOB (free on board) in US dollars. To mitigate the
e⁄ect possible reporting errors, we discard observations where quantity equals one or less than
one, and we also discard observations where the value of exports is below 10 thousand US dollars.
We use the same dataset to compute the RCA of each exporter in each particular HS-6 product.
In what follows, in all our cross sectional regressions, we use only data for year 1995. We have
run, however, the same regressions separately for all years in the panel and all estimates turn
out to be very similar to those of 1995 (some of these results are shown in Appendix B and the
rest are available from the authors upon request).
Our theory implies that when looking at the maximum unit values of exports by each country
in each of the traded products, these extreme prices should correlate positively with the RCA
in those products. To assess this implication, we run the following regression:
log() = ￿ + ￿ log() + ￿ + ￿; (27)
where :  ￿ max
m2
fmg
12There is a large literature in trade using unit values as proxy for quality: e.g., Schott (2004), Hallak (2006),
Fieler (2007). We acknowledge though the fact that unit values should are not a perfect proxy of quality, since other
factors may also a⁄ect prices (for example, the degree of horizontal di⁄erentiation across industries, heterogeneous
transport costs, trade tari⁄s). See Hallak and Schott (2011) for an innovative method to infer quality from prices
taking into account both horizontal and vertical di⁄erentiation of products.
13Gaulier and Zignano (2009) dataset uses United Nations COMTRADE data as its source.
22(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log RCA 0.162 0.214 0.208 0.200
(0.014)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***












Product dummies YES YES YES YES
Exporter dummies NO YES YES YES
Importer dummies NO NO YES YES
Observations 242148 242148 242148 233681
R squared 0.05 0.41 0.42 0.43
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All data is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant term.
The total number of different products is 4898. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable: log of maximum unit value by each exporter
Table 1.A
In (27),  denotes the maximum unit value at which exporter  sells product , across
the set of all importers .14 The regression also includes product dummies, denoted by ￿.
The results of regression (27) are shown in column (1) of Table 1.A. As implied by our model,
the variables log() and log() display a positive correlation, which is also highly
signi￿cant. In the three subsequent columns we sequentially add some additional controls that
may be expected to possibly a⁄ect log(), for reasons other than comparative advantage.
In column (2) we include exporter dummies (i.e., we run the regression: log() =
￿+￿ log()+￿ + +￿). The positive and highly signi￿cant estimate of ￿ remains in
place. In fact, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient linking log() and log() rises by
a fair amount compared to column (1). This result is actually expectable, as it would suggest
that economies that are (overall) more specialised in selling their output abroad tend to charge
relatively lower prices on their exports than those which more specialised in selling their output
14For example: US exports ￿ Automobiles, diesel engine of 1500 cc￿(code 871331) to 68 di⁄erent countries
(importers), after cleaning all the outliers. For each of those 68 importers, we calculate the average unit value of
US exports of the product HS-871331, and then pick the highest of all. (It turns out that the importer paying
the highest average price for ￿ Automobiles, diesel engine of 1500 cc￿produced in the US is Netherlands.)
23in local markets (this could possibly be the e⁄ect that follows from a currency depreciation).15
In column (3) we add a set of dummies for the speci￿c importer buying the product at
the highest unit value sold by each exporter. More precisely, we run the following regression:
log() = ￿ + ￿ log() + ￿ +  + ￿ + ￿, where the term ￿ is the dummy
variable associated to the importer  2  country that solves  ￿ maxm2 fmg in
(27). These dummies would allow us to control for speci￿c characteristics of certain importing
countries (including their income per head) that may lead them to pay, overall, higher (or
lower) prices for their imports. Again, we can observe that our correlation of interest between
log() and log() remains positive and highly signi￿cant.
Finally, in column (4) we add a set of gravity terms speci￿c to the exporter-importer pair
(). In particular, we include the following six variables taken from Mayer and Zignano
(2006): the weighted distance between the exporter and importer, and dummy variables for
common language, common coloniser, common legal origin, common currency, and contiguity.
The coe¢ cient linking log() and log() still remains positive and highly signi￿-
cant. In addition, it is interesting to note that the coe¢ cient on distance is positive, while the
one on contiguity is negative (both highly signi￿cant). These two results seem to suggest that
when selling at distant markets exporters tend to ship higher qualities of speci￿c products.16
One possible caveat with using the maximum unit values, as in Table 1.A, is that some
countries may actually be selling a relatively small share of their exports at that particularly
high level of quality (although this problem is partly mitigated by the fact that we restrict the
sample to exports of at least 10 thousand US dollars). If this is the case, our estimates may
be not capturing exactly the type of correlation that is predicted by our theory, but possibly
only the fact that there is greater variance in productivity across producers located in countries
displaying a comparative advantage in a particular industry (without also necessarily displaying
greater average productivity in producing higher qualities). To deal with this issue, in Column
(1) of Table 1.B we run the same regression as in Column (2) of Table 1.A, but in this case the
dependent variable is the ￿ weighted mean unit value of exports￿ , where the weights are given
by export shares. As it can be readily observed, the correlation is again positive and highly
signi￿cant (though, expectably, of smaller magnitude than that in column (2) of Table 1.A).
15Notice, too, that since we are using a cross section the exporter dummies are also controlling for the exporter￿ s
GDP per head.
16These results are also consistent with those found by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) between US export unit
values of HS-10 products and distance to export markets.
24log  mean u.v. (weighted) log max to min u.v. log coef. variation u.v.
Log RCA 0.064 0.329 0.05
(0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)***
Product dummies YES YES YES
Exporter dummies YES YES YES
Observations 242148 242148 173938
Number of HS-6 products 4898 4898 4893
R squared 0.16 0.50 0.14
Robust absolute standard erros clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All data is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant.
Mean unit values in first column are weighted by their share of exports within that particular product for that particular exporter.
Dependent Variable
Table 1.B
So far we have shown a series of correlations consistent with the notion that economies that
exhibit a comparative advantage in the production of a certain good will export that a particular
good in relatively higher quality levels. However, in addition to that, our model predicts that
such economies will also display a larger dispersion in their quality of exports. In columns (2)
and (3) of Table 1.B, we report the correlation between the log of the RCA and two di⁄erent
measures of dispersion of export unit values, namely: the log of the ratio of the maximum to
the minimum unit value of exports and the log of the coe¢ cient of variation of unit values of
exports. In both cases, the correlation between the proxies for quality dispersion and the log of
the RCA turns out to be positive and highly signi￿cant.
All regressions conducted up to now implicitly assume an identical value of the partial
correlation coe¢ cient ￿ for all HS-6 products. However, it is quite evident that not all types
of goods display the same scope of quality upgrading. In fact, there exist goods like vehicles
where the length of the quality ladders is substantially larger than those of fruit products. Our
mechanism linking the degree of specialization in given products and the quality of exports of
those products should be stronger in goods with longer ladders. In Table 1.C we provide evidence
consistence with this conjecture. We ￿rst proxy the length of the quality ladder of each of the
HS-6 products by computing the ratio of maximum-to-minimum export unit values. Next, in
the ￿rst and second columns, we run again the regression conducted in column (3) of Table 1.A,
but this time using, respectively, only the subset of products in the top and bottom decile of
the proxied length of ladders distribution. As we can observe, the point estimate for long ladder
goods almost doubles that of short ladder goods, and the di⁄erence between the estimates is
highly signi￿cant. Lastly, in the third and fourth columns, we run these two regressions again
but for the top and bottom 5 percentile of the distribution of length of ladders: the discrepancy
25Short ladder goods Long ladder goods Short ladder goods Long ladder goods
(bottom 10% length) (top 10% length) (bottom 5% length) (top 5% length)
Log RCA 0.121 0.219 0.117 0.216
(0.004)*** (0.012)*** (0.006)*** (0.014)***
Product dummies YES YES YES YES
Exporter dummies YES YES YES YES
Importer dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 15030 30575 6619 15347
Number of HS-6 products 490 490 245 245
R squared 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.39
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All data is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant term
Table 1.C
Dependent Variable: log of maximum unit value by each exporter
in the point estimate remains essentially intact.
Exporters Behaviour across Time:
Our model is a static one. In particular, it assumes that production functions are given from
the onset and once-and-for-all. It is not hard, however, to conjecture its main implications
within a more dynamic version of it, where specialisation may possibly evolve over time. On the
one hand, for example, it may well be the case that it takes time for economies to accumulate
the required knowledge, human capital or infrastructure to produce and export certain goods;
similarly, it may be that certain input sources are discovered or become available only at some
particular point in time (after  = 0). On the other hand, even if technology is actually given
once-and-for-all, in a context of secular growth in the world (as our analysis in Section 3.3 could
actually be interpreted), our theory would still predict that the positive correlation between
export specialisation and export prices should be captured by variation across time.
From this perspective, we could think of our previous correlations between export special-
isation and export unit values within a time series, exploiting the across-time variation within
countries. In that regard, our theory should predict that, as economies develop a comparative
advantage in product , they should concomitantly export product  at higher unit values than
the rest. We show evidence of this relationship in Table 2, where we regress the di⁄erence
between the log() recorded in 2009 and that recorded in 1995 against the di⁄erence
between the log() in those two years. More precisely, in column (1), we run:
log(09) ¬ log(95) =  + [log(09) ¬ log(95)] + ￿ (28)
Notice that (28) is just the di⁄erence between (27) in years 2009 and 1995, which removes both
26(1) (2) (3)
Δ(Log RCA)09-95 0.183 0.191 0.185
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Product dummies NO YES YES
Exporter dummies NO YES YES
Gravity Terms NO NO YES
Observations 193084 193084 181197
R squared 0.05 0.09 0.09
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term.
Gravity terms include: weighted distance between exporter and importer, dummy for common language, contiguity,
common coloniser, common legal origin, and common currency. Full Results are displayed in the Appendix.
The total number of different products is 4756.
Dep. Variable: Δ(log of max unit value by each exporter)09-95
Table 2
product and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects and generates ￿ = ￿2009 ¬ ￿1995.17 As we can see,
the estimate of  is positive and highly signi￿cant; moreover, its magnitude is also surprisingly
similar to that of the estimated ￿ in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.A, suggesting that the
possible presence of product-exporter ￿xed e⁄ects tainting cross-sectional correlations in Table
1.A is not of much concern in this dataset.
In column (2) we add product and exporter dummies to (28). The former would control
for the possibility that results may be in￿ uenced by the e⁄ect of heterogeneous income demand
elasticities across di⁄erent HS-6 products. The latter would control for the possibility that
changes in export penetration and export prices may be simultaneously responding to some
countries growing faster than others. Nevertheless, our estimate for the correlation between
￿log()09¬95 and ￿log()09¬95 remains essentially intact both in magnitude and
signi￿cance. Finally, in column (3) we include the di⁄erences in the gravity terms corresponding
to the speci￿c importer that purchased product  from exporter  at the maximum price sold by
 in years 2009 and 1995. Again, we ￿nd a positive and highly signi￿cant value for our correlation
of interest. In addition, as it can be observed from the table in Appendix B displaying the full
set of results, the time-di⁄erence estimates for the gravity terms also turn out to be quite similar
to those in column (4) of Table 1.A.
17In addition, if the presence of product-exporter ￿xed e⁄ects could have possibly contaminated our previous
cross-sectional results, those ￿xed e⁄ects should also be removed by taking time di⁄erences as in regression (28).
275.2 Importers Behaviour
Another key aspect of our theory is how imports respond to variations in incomes. Our model
predicts that changes in incomes will lead to: i) changes in the quality of consumption, and ii)
changes in the distribution of total production across di⁄erent economies. The former result
stems from our nonhomothetic preferences, while the latter derives from the assumed increasing
heterogeneity of production costs at higher levels of quality. In short, our model predicts the
following:
1. Richer consumers will buy their imports of product  in higher quality levels than poorer
consumers do. As a consequence, the average unit values of imports of product  should
correlate positively with the importer￿ s GDP per head.
2. Richer consumers will buy a larger share of their consumption of product  from coun-
tries exhibiting a comparative advantage in product  than poorer consumers do. As a
consequence, the share of imports originating from exporters exhibiting a comparative
advantage in product  should correlate positively with GDP per head of the importer.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.A we report the correlation between the (weighted) mean
unit values of imports and GDP per head.18 In the ￿rst column we only include product
dummies. As robustness check, in the second column, we add a set of geographical controls
(area, population, density, distance to equator, latitude, longitude, landlocked dummy and island
dummy) and a set of dummy variables for continents.19 In both cases the variable of interest
exhibits a positive and highly signi￿cant correlation.20
Our preference speci￿cation also implies that the positive association between income per
head and unit values should be relatively more pronounced for goods that exhibit longer quality
ladders. Analogously to Table 1.C, the following four columns of Table 3.A re-run the regression
displayed in column (2), but using only the bottom and top decile, and the bottom and top 5
18The mean unit values of imports of product  by importer  are computed by weighting the unit values of
product  sold by each exporter  to  by their respective share over the total value of imports of  by 
19Full results are reported in Appendix B.
20See Fieler (2007) for a more thorough analysis of this particular correlation. More precisely, using the entire
panel in Gaulier and Zignano (2009), she ￿nds that unit prices of imports correlate positively with the level
of income per head of the importer, even when looking at goods originating from the same exporter and HS-6
category.
28Short ladder Long ladder Short ladder Long ladder
(1) (2) (bottom 10%) (top 10%) (bottom 5%) (top 5%)
Log GDP per head 0.177 0.205 0.118 0.215 0.127 0.220
(0.017)*** (0.024)*** (0.014)*** (0.03)*** (0.022)*** (0.032)***
Product dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importer geog. controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Continental dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 420623 415343 23258 51377 9785 25339
Number of HS-6 products 4898 4898 490 490 245 245
R squared 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer level in parentheses. Importer geographical controls include: area, population, density,
distance to equator, latitude, longitude, landlocked dummy, and island dummy. Continental dummies include: Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania.
All data is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant term
Dependent Variable: log (weighted) mean unit value of imports
All goods
Table 3.A
percentile, of the distribution of length of quality ladders, proxied by the ratio of maximum-
to-minimum unit values. As it can be readily observed, the point estimate of the correlation
between income and import prices is larger for long-ladder goods than for short-ladder goods,
and the di⁄erences are signi￿cant at 10% level.
The previous correlations are consistent with the idea that richer individuals purchase goods
in higher quality levels. However, they remain silent in terms of where those imports actually
come from. Our second prediction stated above relates to this issue. More precisely, if it is true
that taste for quality rises with income and that countries￿comparative advantage in produc-
tion become more pronounced at higher levels of quality, then richer countries should purchase a
larger share of their imports of given products from economies displaying a comparative advan-
tage in those products. In Tables 3.B and 3.C we aim at providing evidence of such relationship
between income per head and origin of imports.
We ￿rst construct a measure of the ￿ revealed comparative advantage of imports￿as a weighted
average of the RCA of the exporters where the imports of product  by importer  originate











where  denotes the value of imports of product  by importer  originating from
exporter . In column (1) we regress the dependent variable (29) against the log of GDP
per head and product dummies. In column (2) we add geographical controls and continental
dummies. In both cases, the estimate of the coe¢ cient linking log of RCA of imports and log of
GDP per head is positive and highly signi￿cant, in line with our model. As further robustness
29(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per head 0.167 0.173
(0.02)*** (0.04)***
Δ(Log GDP per head)09-95 0.206 0.213
(0.069)*** (0.068)***
Product dummies YES YES NO YES
Importer geogr. controls NO YES - -
Continental dummies NO YES - -
Observations 587557 579950 511960 511960
Number of HS-6 products 5017 5017 4894 4894
R squared 0.02 0.04 0.002 0.002
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer level in parentheses. Importer geogr. controls include: area, population, density,
dist. to equator, latitude, longitude, landlocked dummy, and island dummy. Continental dummies: Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania.
All data in columns (1) and (2) is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant term
Dependent Variable
Table 3.B
log RCA of imports Δ(Log RCA of imports)09-95
check, in columns (3) and (4) we conduct the same kind of regressions but this time exploiting
time di⁄erences within countries over the period between years 2009 and 1995. This would allow
us to control, for example, for the presence of importers ￿xed e⁄ects (beyond those captured by
geographical controls and continental dummies). As we can readily observe, the results using
variation across time are in concordance with those of the cross-sectional analysis in columns
(1) and (2).
A similar type of exercise is presented in Table 3.C, where we regress the share of imports
of product  by importer  originating from exporter  on the RCA of  in  interacted with
the importer￿ s income per head. More precisely, we conduct the following regression, where 






=  + log()
+   [log() ￿ log()] + ￿ + ￿ +  + ￿;
(30)
where we expect to ￿nd a positive value for   . This would, again, suggest that richer importers
tend to buy a larger share of the imports of product  from exporters exhibiting a comparative
advantage in .
Firstly, in column (1), we regress the dependent variable of (30) against only the log of
the RCA of exporter  in product  (together with product, importer and exporter dummies),
which shows as we would expect that those two variables are positively correlated. Secondly,
in column (2), we report the results of regression (30), where we can see that the estimated  
is positive and highly signi￿cant, consistent with our theory. Finally, in column (3), we add to
30(1) (2) (3)
Log RCA exporter 0.438 -0.897 -0.734
(0.029)*** (0.161)*** (0.136)***
Inter. term (log Y m × log RCA exporter) 0.142 0.132
(0.018)*** (0.016)***












Importer dummies YES YES YES
Product dummies YES YES YES
Exporter dummies YES YES YES
Observations 4545789 4282269 4137695
R squared 0.42 0.42 0.48
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. All data is for year 1995. All regressions include a constant.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable: Impo shares of product i from exporter x
Table 3.C
(30) the six gravity terms from Mayer and Zignano (2006), and we can observe the previous
results remain essentially intact. We can also observe that the estimates for each of the gravity
terms are signi￿cant, and they all carry the expected sign.
To conclude, taken jointly, our results seem to yield support to the following ideas: (i) as
getting richer, countries tend to raise the quality of the goods they consume (positive correlation
between import prices and income per head of importer); (ii) this, in turn, leads them to raise
their import shares originating from exporters displaying a comparative advantage in those
products (positive correlation between the expression in (29) and income per head of importer,
and positive interaction term in equation (30)); (iii) this alteration in the origin of imports would
re￿ ect the fact that these are the exporters relatively more e¢ cient at providing higher quality
varieties of those products (positive correlation between export prices and RCA of exporter).
316 Conclusion
We presented a Ricardian model of trade with the distinctive feature that heterogeneities in sec-
toral productivities between countries reveal themselves gradually over the path of development,
as incomes grow and wealthier consumers raise the quality of their consumption baskets. The
emergence of such heterogeneities alters trade ￿ ows across countries: each economy gradually
specialises in producing the subset of goods for which they enjoy a rising comparative advantage.
Our model yields a number of implications that ￿nd empirical support. Using bilateral trade
data at the product level, we found that the average unit values of imports of each speci￿c
product correlate positively with the importer￿ s GDP per head, consistent with the prediction
that richer consumers will buy their imports of each speci￿c product in higher-quality varieties
than poorer consumers do. More importantly, we ￿nd that the share of imports originating
from exporters exhibiting a comparative advantage in a given product correlates positively with
GDP per head of the importer, consistent with the prediction that richer consumers buy a larger
share of their consumption of given products from countries exhibiting a comparative advantage
in those product. We also provide evidence supporting the central assumption of our model,
namely the intensi￿cation of comparative advantage at higher quality levels. In particular, we
found that the degree of specialization of countries in speci￿c goods and the level of quality of
their exports display a positive correlation, both in the cross-section and exploiting variation
across time.
Finally, we also investigated some extensions of the benchmark model. In that regard, the
role of trade is of particular interest. An important implication of this extension is that trade
costs generate a positive relationship between the imports/GDP ratio and the level GDP per
head. This is because trade costs impose milder frictions on higher-quality varieties, which tend
to be consumed in higher proportion by richer individuals.
32Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Preliminarily, notice that: a) from (11) it follows that, for a given
 2 fg, b ￿
=d￿ Q 0 , b ￿
=d￿ Q 0 and b ￿
 Q 0 , b ￿
 Q 0; b) from (7) it follows
that ￿￿ = 0 and ￿ ￿ 0. Let  = . The proof for  =  follows an analogous
reasoning, and it is available from authors upon request.
Part i) Compute total di⁄erentiation of (12) with respect to b ￿
 and ￿:
￿









































































Rearranging terms and simplifying:
d￿ =
nh
1 + b ￿











1 + b ￿












Denote the RHS of this last expression by ￿b ￿
. Using (7), it follows that ￿ + (1 ¬ ￿) ￿ 1
and ￿ + 1 ¬ ￿ ￿ 1, hence:
￿ =
h
1 + b ￿











1 + b ￿

































￿  0. Our ￿rst preliminary statement then implies that b ￿
 =d￿  0 also holds.



































































































33where I￿ 2 [01] takes a non-zero value only when the relative wage is in the vicinity of  = 1.







































































which then cancels out with the second term. Notice that the third and sixth terms also cancel
out, as they have non-zero value only when in the vicinity of  = 1, exactly the case when the




































Thus, bearing in mind that ￿  0, b ￿
  0 must hold. Finally, once again, our ￿rst
preliminary statement then implies that b ￿
   0 also holds.
Proof of Lemma 2. Notice ￿rst that, when  = 1, (11) yields b ￿
 = b ￿
 = b ￿ and b ￿
 = b ￿
 =




























































, the two equations above imply
b ￿ = b ￿ = b ￿.
21The underlying function relates ￿ and ￿ on the threshold dividing the set of high-quality goods purchased
abroad, for which inequality (9) holds, from those purchased domestically, for which inequality (10) holds instead.




(1 + ￿)[1 ¬ (￿)] (￿)d￿ + (1 ¬ (b ￿))
2 = ￿:
Bearing in mind that
R  ￿
0 (￿) (￿)d￿ = [(b ￿)]
2 2 and
R  ￿





￿ [1 ¬ (￿)] (￿)d￿ = ￿ ¬ 1 (32)
Di⁄erentiating (32), we get that
b ￿
d￿
= [2b ￿ [1 ¬ (b ￿)] (b ￿)]
¬1 ;




0 ￿(￿)￿ =  [￿], we may obtain the condition b ￿ = 1 for all ￿  1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿).
Proof of Proposition 1. Firstly, notice that from Lemma 2 that, when  = 1: a) b ￿
 =
b ￿
 = b ￿
 = b ￿








for any ￿ = ￿, hence the ￿rst terms of both





























Therefore, as long as ￿ = 12,  = 1 is an equilibrium for any ￿ ￿ 1.
Secondly, suppose in equilibrium   1. Then, from (7) we have ￿ = 1. As a consequence, the






































































































was de￿ned in (31). Notice now that condition (11) implies b ￿
  b ￿

and b ￿
  b ￿






























35However this is impossible when   1, since in that case ￿(￿) = (1 + ￿)¬1  ￿¬1 (￿) =
(1 + ￿) ¬ 1.
Lastly, suppose in equilibrium   1. Then, from (7) we have ￿ = 0, and the equilibrium in the

































































































Notice now that condition (11) implies b ￿
  b ￿
 and b ￿
  b ￿
 when   1. Hence, from (35)






























However this is impossible when   1, since in that case ￿(￿) = (1 + ￿)¬1  ￿¬1 (￿) =
(1 + ￿) ¬ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Di⁄erentiating (15) with respect to ￿ yields:
 [￿jdemanded]
￿
= b ￿(￿)[1 ¬ (b ￿(￿))] (b ￿(￿))
b ￿
￿
















As a result, whenever b ￿￿  0, it must be the case that  [￿jdem.]￿  0, since
b ￿(￿)   [￿j￿  b ￿(￿)]. The other two parts of the proof follow immediately from replac-
ing, respectively, b ￿(1) = 0 and b ￿(￿) = 1 for all ￿  1 + 2( [￿] ¬ ￿), into (15).


























(b ￿) ¬ [(b ￿)]
2 2
i
; and also that
R 1




























Proof of Proposition 4. Using the de￿nition of ￿, for  = 1 the budget constraint for an
























































































from which we immeditately infer that b ￿
=d￿  0, since the quantity in braces is positive.
Note also that the LHS and the RHS of (24) respectively represent the value of exports and
imports by  (also, imports and exports by ) relative to GDP. Consider the former, and
denote by ￿ the derivative of the LHS with respect to ￿ (which must equalise the derivative of
the RHS: all the following consideration thus apply for imports by  and exports by ):
￿ ￿
￿






















Then, our claim follows by noticing that ￿ ￿ 0, with strict inequality if b ￿
  1, since
b ￿
b ￿
 = 1=￿  0 and b ￿
=d￿  0.
Proof of Proposition 5.









































































































Also, when  ￿ 1, we have b ￿











































 ￿, the above cannot hold when  (￿) satis￿es non-
decreasing hazard rate.

















































Di⁄erentiating (37) with respect to b ￿
, bearing in mind that b ￿





























 ¬  [￿j￿  b ￿
])  0; (38)
where the negative sign in (38) stems from the fact that, when   ￿, b ￿
  b ￿
, and b ￿
 
 [￿j￿  b ￿
].
Now, let us look at the case in which  ￿ ￿. If   ￿, we have that ￿ = 1; while is  = ￿, then
b ￿
 = b ￿
















































38Di⁄erentiating (39) with respect to b ￿
, bearing in mind that b ￿






 [1 ¬ (b ￿
)] (b ￿









= [1 ¬ (b ￿
)] (b ￿
)(b ￿
 ¬  [￿j￿  b ￿
])  0; (40)
where the negative sign in (40) stems from the fact that, when  ￿ ￿, b ￿
 ￿ b ￿
, and b ￿
 
 [￿j￿  b ￿
].
Lastly, since when   1, then b ￿
  b ￿










39Appendix B: Additional Empirical Results
Table 1.A and 1.B (all years)
Year 1996 Year 2000
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.161 0.218 0.068 0.340 Log RCA 0.181 0.240 0.077 0.370
(0.013)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 257296 257296 257296 257296 Observations 267008 267008 267008 267008
R squared 0.05 0.4 0.16 0.51 R squared 0.06 0.4 0.14 0.52
Year 1997 Year 2001
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. maximum unit value weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.161 0.220 0.068 0.345 Log RCA 0.179 0.240 0.075 0.379
(0.013)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 258409 258409 258409 258409 Observations 269238 269238 269238 269238
R squared 0.04 0.4 0.15 0.51 R squared 0.05 0.4 0.13 0.52
Year 1998 Year 2002
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. maximum unit value weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.165 0.227 0.070 0.354 Log RCA 0.184 0.240 0.074 0.378
(0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 260569 260569 260569 260569 Observations 271384 271384 271384 271384
R squared 0.05 0.4 0.15 0.51 R squared 0.06 0.4 0.13 0.53
Year 1999 Year 2003
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. maximum unit value weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.174 0.238 0.075 0.371 Log RCA 0.187 0.235 0.072 0.375
(0.013)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.006 )*** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 259090 259090 259090 259090 Observations 278231 278231 278231 278231
R squared 0.05 0.4 0.14 0.51 R squared 0.06 0.41 0.15 0.52
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Year 2004 Year 2007
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.187 0.225 0.070 0.364 Log RCA 0.173 0.195 0.061 0.305
(0.012)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 285329 285329 285329 285329 Observations 307183 307183 307183 307183
R squared 0.06 0.41 0.15 0.51 R squared 0.07 0.42 0.15 0.52
Year 2005 Year 2008
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. maximum unit value weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.161 0.188 0.054 0.303 Log RCA 0.175 0.192 0.060 0.300
(0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 305239 305239 305239 305239 Observations 308570 308570 308570 308570
R squared 0.06 0.42 0.16 0.53 R squared 0.08 0.41 0.15 0.52
Year 2006 Year 2009
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v. maximum unit value weighted mean u.v. max to min u.v.
Log RCA 0.161 0.185 0.053 0.299 Log RCA 0.157 0.191 0.061 0.294
(0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Product FE YES YES YES YES Product FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter FE NO YES YES YES Exporter FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 303236 303236 303236 303236 Observations 286338 286338 286338 286338
R squared 0.07 0.41 0.16 0.52 R squared 0.06 0.4 0.14 0.51
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
Dependent Variable: all in logarithms
maximum unit value
40Table 2 (full results)
(1) (2) (4)
Δ(Log RCA)09-95 0.183 0.191 0.185
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***












Product fixed effects NO YES YES
Exporter fixed effects NO YES YES
Observations 193084 193084 181197
R squared 0.05 0.09 0.09
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the exporter level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable: Δ(log of max unit value by each exporter)09-95
Table 3.B (full results)
(1) (3)










Density x 1000 -0.024
(0.0183)
Latitude x 100 -.028
(0.168)
Dist. to equator x 100 0.148
(0.306)
Longitude x 100 0.036
(0.093)
Product fixed effects NO YES
Continent fixed effects NO YES
Observations 587557 579950
R squared 0.02 0.04
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer level in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable: log RCA of imports
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